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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the impact of the global 
ﬁ   nancial crisis on euro area cross-border 
ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows by comparing recent 
developments with the main pre-crisis trends. 
Two prominent features of the period of turmoil 
were (i) the sizeable deleveraging of external 
ﬁ  nancial exposures by the private sector and, 
in particular, the banking sector from 2008 and 
(ii) the signiﬁ  cant changes in the composition 
of euro area cross-border portfolio ﬂ  ows,  as 
investors shifted from equity to debt instruments, 
from long-term to short-term debt instruments 
and from private to public sector securities. 
Since 2009 such trends have started reversing. 
However, as balance sheet restructuring 
by  ﬁ   nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial  corporations 
continues, cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows  have 
remained well below pre-crisis levels. The 
degree of resumption and volatility of cross-
border  ﬁ   nancial activity may have a major 
bearing on growth prospects for the euro area 
and may also matter from a ﬁ  nancial stability 
perspective. We argue that the recent experience, 
ﬁ  rst of extraordinary growth and then of scaling 
down of international ﬁ  nancial activity, calls for 
enhanced monitoring of developments in cross-
border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows so that  the underlying 
risks to the domestic economy stemming from 
the  ﬁ   nancial sector can be better assessed. 
Looking forward, successful implementation 
of policy actions to promote macroeconomic 
discipline and enhance ﬁ  nancial  regulation 
and supervision could inﬂ  uence, inter alia, the 
composition and volume of cross-border capital 
ﬂ   ows, contributing to a more efﬁ  cient  and 
sustainable allocation of resources. 
JEL code: E44 E58 F33 F42.
Keywords: global ﬁ   nancial crisis, euro area, 
capital ﬂ  ows.5
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NON-TECHNICAL 
SUMMARY NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis that started in 2007 
and intensiﬁ   ed after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 abruptly interrupted 
the more than two-decade-long process of 
increasing world ﬁ  nancial integration. With the 
complex web of global interlinkages contributing 
to the spreading of the turmoil from the 
United States to the rest of the world, the crisis 
led to unprecedented declines, or even reversals, 
in global cross-border capital ﬂ  ows. Although 
ﬁ  nancial markets have bounced back from their 
lows, cross-border capital ﬂ  ows have generally 
remained well below their pre-crisis levels.
The advanced economies, which have 
traditionally dominated global capital ﬂ  ows and 
were considered immune from sudden capital 
withdrawals, were particularly affected. Prior to 
the crisis, the euro area current account was close 
to balance, with cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows 
mostly cancelling out when all components are 
summed. In net terms this indicated that the euro 
area was neither receiving nor exporting large 
capital ﬂ  ows, although signiﬁ  cant developments 
were occurring in gross terms. The ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, however, affected not only those 
countries with large current account deﬁ  cits but 
all countries with open capital accounts. 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the 
unprecedented adjustments triggered by the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis in euro area cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows. We ﬁ  nd that during the turmoil there was 
a very sizeable scaling-down of gross external 
asset holdings across all types of investors and 
the whole range of instruments, amid soaring 
risk aversion, high liquidity needs, and balance 
sheet restructuring. Flows reversed and their 
volatility markedly increased, with potentially 
adverse effects for the real economy and ﬁ  nancial 
stability. The strong increase in home bias and 
ﬂ  ight-to-safety behaviour was also manifested 
in shifts in the composition of cross-border 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, from equity to debt instruments, 
from long-term to short-term debt instruments 
and from private sector to public sector debt. 
At the same time, deleveraging activity in relation 
to cross-border loans and deposits reached 
high levels. The ﬁ  nancial crisis also changed 
the sectoral breakdown of the euro area’s net 
external borrowing, with the government sector 
becoming the main, and for most of 2010 the 
only, net borrower from abroad. This was in 
line with the rise in government borrowing 
worldwide (and especially in the advanced 
economies), which was partly driven by higher 
ﬁ  nancing needs on the part of governments in 
response to the crisis, but also by heightened 
global risk aversion on the part of investors.
As the global economy started to show signs of 
stabilisation in 2009 some of the trends in gross 
cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows observed during the 
crisis abated or even reversed, towards the end of 
the year, particularly in the case of portfolio and 
direct investment. As regards other investment, 
deleveraging in relation to cross-border loans 
and deposits continued apace in 2009, with 
some signs of a normalisation, both on the asset 
and on the liability sides, only emerging in the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2010. 
Looking ahead, it is still uncertain which trends 
will prevail in the near future. Investors appear 
to have become more selective in qualitative 
terms, for example by increasingly differentiating 
across countries in relation to government debt 
securities. While the global economic outlook 
and ﬁ  scal developments are expected to play a 
key role, overall international ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows 
could still be affected by the balance sheet 
restructuring of ﬁ   nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations in advanced economies, including 
the euro area. Following the surge in international 
ﬁ  nancial activity prior to the crisis, the recovery 
may not be synchronised across different world 
regions, as shown by the stronger rebound of 
cross-border ﬂ  ows to emerging markets.1
Rottier and Veron (2010, p.3) illustrate how the share of  1 
emerging markets in the 100 largest banks has been steadily 
increasing and has overtaken that of Europe. These banks have 
engaged in a limited degree of cross-border activity, but this 
could change. According to these authors, one can expect that 
“the combination of deleveraging in the West and continued 
ﬁ  nancial development in the emerging economies will certainly 
reinforce the trend toward multipolarity”.6
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The signiﬁ  cant changes in euro area cross-border 
ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows brought about by the global 
ﬁ   nancial crisis also have important policy 
implications. The reversal and heightened 
volatility of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows may have adverse 
impacts on short- and long-term growth 
prospects and may also matter from a ﬁ  nancial 
stability perspective. This calls for expanding 
the analysis of cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows – 
a challenging task, as is widely recognised. 
Apart from providing a better understanding 
of the ﬁ   nancial transmission channel during 
ﬁ  nancial crises, the identiﬁ  cation of signiﬁ  cant 
changes in cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows  and 
stocks could be an important element in the 
early detection of the emergence and build-up 
of macroeconomic risks and risks to ﬁ  nancial 
stability. As this paper argues, along the lines 
of a burgeoning literature, the monitoring 
should be extended to developments in gross 
ﬂ  ows and not just net ﬂ  ows, as the latter may 
mask the accumulation of macroeconomic 
imbalances and ﬁ  nancial risks. 
This paper also underscores the need for 
policy actions to promote macroeconomic 
discipline and enhance ﬁ  nancial  regulation 
and supervision. The impact of the crisis on 
cross-border  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows has shown that 
sound and stable macroeconomic policies are 
both important elements in keeping capital 
ﬂ  ows on a sustainable path, while preserving the 
gains from ﬁ   nancial openness and mitigating 
the adverse consequences of turbulent times. 
In addition, the patterns of cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows seen during the ﬁ  nancial crisis call for 
broadening the scope of ﬁ  nancial  supervision 
and regulation to also include other ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries apart from banks. Prudential 
regulation is likely to inﬂ  uence the composition 
and, to a smaller degree, the volume of 
cross-border  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows, leading to the 
building of additional buffers in the ﬁ  nancial 
sector that could help reduce cross-country and 
cross-sectoral ﬁ  nancial fragilities.7
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I   INTRODUCTION
1 INTRODUCTION
Economies around the world were severely hit 
by the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, particularly after it 
intensiﬁ  ed in September 2008. One consequence 
of the crisis was that the two-decade continuous 
rise in international ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows was not just 
interrupted, but sizeable reversals and unwinding 
of international exposures by the private sector 
and more markedly by banks were observed. 
As those ﬂ  ows have been traditionally dominated 
by advanced economies, it is not surprising 
that these were the countries and regions most 
affected by the crisis. 
There is a burgeoning literature on the 
impact of the ﬁ   nancial crisis on cross-border 
capital  ﬂ   ows, reviewing the experience of the 
United States (e.g. Bertaut and Pounder (2009)) 
or taking a global perspective (e.g. Forbes and 
Warnock (2011), IMF (2010b), IMF (2011), 
OECD (2011) and Milesi-Ferretti and 
Tille (2011)). Other studies focus instead 
on banking ﬂ   ows, as the banking sector has 
signiﬁ   cantly reduced international ﬁ  nancial 
claims (e.g. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) and 
the Bank for International Settlements (2009a, 
b, c and d)). This paper is however the ﬁ  rst to 
review the impact of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis on 
all cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows from a euro area 
perspective. Contrasting the recent developments 
with the main trends prior to the crisis and 
covering the full set of available indicators, 
relating to instruments as well as sectors, 
it highlights the unprecedented adjustments 
triggered by the ﬁ  nancial crisis. Like other recent 
studies (Forbes and Warnock (2011), Broner 
et al. (2010) and Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011)), 
it shows that it is not enough to examine 
cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows in net terms, but that 
it is necessary to investigate “gross” measures 
too, i.e. the asset and liability sides separately, 
as this may provide additional insights on the 
gradual build up of ﬁ  nancial vulnerabilities. 
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 
presents some stylised facts illustrating the 
rising importance of cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows 
prior to the crisis and summarises the main 
channels through which those ﬂ  ows can affect 
individual economies. Chapter 3 reviews the 
main pre-crisis trends in euro area cross-border 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, examines the signiﬁ  cant changes 
brought about by the crisis and discusses recent 
developments and future prospects. Finally, 
Chapter 4 explores how cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows can help policymakers in their assessments 
and seeks to identify possible lessons.8
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2  THE INCREASING ROLE OF CROSS-BORDER 
FINANCIAL FLOWS 
The global ﬁ   nancial crisis that started with 
the meltdown of the United States sub-prime 
mortgage market in 2007 was preceded by 
more than two decades of increasing world 
ﬁ   nancial integration. During that period, 
advanced and emerging economies became 
more accessible to a growing array of ﬁ  nancial 
investors through the lifting of capital 
restrictions, and more interlinked through 
larger cross-border ﬁ  nancial  holdings. 
Offering new opportunities to diversify risk 
internationally, those developments, together 
with advances in ﬁ  nancial innovation, resulted 
in higher availability of capital worldwide, 
contributing to a better allocation of resources 
while enabling a strong global economic 
expansion to take place. Rising ﬁ  nancial 
integration and the creation of innovative 
ﬁ   nancial instruments were the underlying 
factors that allowed private economic agents 
to gradually increase their leverage, which, at 
the aggregate level, also meant that markets 
and countries were becoming more prone to 
domestic and external shocks. Providing the 
background for the analysis of the impact of 
the  ﬁ   nancial crisis on euro area cross-border 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, this chapter brieﬂ  y looks at the 
main drivers underlying the rise in international 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows prior to the crisis. In parallel, 
it summarises the beneﬁ  ts and costs of ﬁ  nancial 
integration by also providing an overview of 
the main channels through which cross-border 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows affect the domestic economy.
2.1  GLOBAL FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION 
AND INNOVATION 
The degree of global ﬁ  nancial market integration 
has increased signiﬁ  cantly since the late 1980s. 
Total cross-border ﬁ  nancial assets and liabilities 
almost tripled from 125% of global GDP in 1990 
to 360% in 2007, with the advanced economies  2 
accounting for the largest part of this increase 
(see Chart 1). The rapid expansion in 
cross-border ﬁ  nancial activity was broad-based 
across different types of investment (see Chart 2) 
and was mainly fostered by the liberalisation of 
national ﬁ  nancial markets, a process which was 
initiated in the advanced economies but gradually 
spread to the emerging world. The progressive 
easing or abolishing of capital controls and other 
ﬁ   nancial account restrictions, together with 
an improving economic environment and 
international investment prospects, encouraged 
capital to ﬂ  ow around the global economy. 
The liberalisation of global ﬁ  nancial  markets 
was also accompanied by a process of ﬁ  nancial 
innovation and deepening, which gathered pace 
in the years prior to the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
The establishment of increasingly liquid markets 
Country groups are according to the IMF World Economic Outlook  2 
classiﬁ  cation. The group of advanced economies includes the euro 
area, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden and Switzerland, as well as the newly industrialised Asian 
countries Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
Chart 1 International financial integration
(sum of outstanding amounts of cross-border assets and liabilities 



























Sources: ECB staff calculations based on the updated and 
extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II 
database developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
Last observation refers to 2007.9
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2   THE INCREASING 
ROLE OF CROSS-BORDER 
FINANCIAL FLOWS 
for new ﬁ  nancial instruments, such as securitised 
debt and other derivative contracts – issued in 
part by new ﬁ  nancial entities, such as special 
purpose vehicles (SPVs) – largely accounted for 
the massive surge in cross-border purchases of 
ﬁ  nancial assets in the major advanced economies, 
in particular over the period from 2005 to 
mid-2007. Originally intended to improve the 
distribution of risk across savers, such instruments 
were extensively used by a number of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, including hedge funds and private 
equity funds in search of higher returns. Chart 3 
shows the rampant growth, ﬁ  rst in the United 
States and somewhat later in the euro area, in 
the issuance of asset-backed securities (ABSs) 
and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) over the 
Chart 2 International financial integration by type of investment




















































Sources: ECB staff calculations based on the updated and extended version of the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database developed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Last observation refers to 2007.
Chart 3 Total issuance of ABSs and MBSs
(USD millions)
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Sources: Poloni and Reynaud (2009).10
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past ten years (Moutot and Vitale (2009)), while 
Chart 4 illustrates the sudden, sharp increase 
in global credit derivatives over the three years 
preceding the crisis.
Overall, international ﬁ   nancial integration, as 
measured by the sum of cross-border assets and 
liabilities, increased from 188% in 1999 to 325% 
of GDP in 2007 for the euro area, this being 
comparable to the upward trend seen in the 
United States, while the rise was even sharper 
in the case of the United Kingdom. This is not 
surprising, considering that the ﬁ  nancial sector 
represents a high share of total value added in 
the United Kingdom and is highly exposed to 
cross-border activities, given its international 
intermediation role (see Chart 5).
2.2  BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION  3
The increase in global ﬁ  nancial integration due 
to  ﬁ   nancial liberalisation and innovation, as 
documented by the rapid pre-crisis expansion 
of cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows,  highlights 
the rising weight of international ﬁ  nancial 
transactions relative to trade transactions. At 
least in the short to medium term, this makes 
cross-border  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows potentially as 
important as trade ﬂ   ows in determining the 
dynamics of exchange rates and interest rates 
(Moutot and Vitale (2009)).
While the more recent debate has naturally 
focused on the destabilising impact of the 
global  ﬁ   nancial integration process, both as 
an underlying component and ampliﬁ  er  of 
the international transmission mechanism, 
the ﬁ  nancial integration process has also clearly 
been beneﬁ  cial. The case for greater ﬁ  nancial 
integration and openness generally revolves 
around three main considerations:
 Beneﬁ   ts from international risk sharing (1) . 
By allowing a country to borrow in “bad” 
times and lend in “good” times, ﬁ  nancial 
openness enhances consumption and income 
risk-sharing, while reducing the volatility of 
consumption growth. This “counter-cyclical 
role” of world capital markets is particularly 
important if shocks are temporary. Besides, 
improved risk-sharing enhances in turn 
the ability of countries to specialise in 
This section mainly draws from Agénor (2003) and González- 3 
Páramo (2010).
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Source: ISDA.
Chart 5 Financial integration of selected 
advanced economies in the years prior to 
the crisis
(sum of outstanding amounts of cross-border assets and liabilities 























Sources: ECB and Haver Analytics. 
Note: Last observation refers to 2010, except for the United 
States and United Kingdom (2009).11
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2   THE INCREASING 
ROLE OF CROSS-BORDER 
FINANCIAL FLOWS 
their most productive sectors, leading to 
increased economic efﬁ  ciency.4
  (2)  Positive impact on domestic investment 
and growth. The ability to draw on an 
international pool of resources should 
stimulate domestic investment and growth. 
While this channel mostly applies to 
emerging countries, whose investment 
is no longer constrained by the restricted 
pool of domestic savings, the ﬁ  nancial 
integration process also ampliﬁ  es  growth 
opportunities in developed countries. In 
addition to the beneﬁ  ts from improved risk-
sharing, cross-border banking enhances 
the ability of countries to specialise in 
their most productive sectors. This leads 
to increased economic efﬁ  ciency, reduces 
the risk of crisis due to the mis-pricing of 
investment risk  5 and ultimately fosters an 
optimally diversiﬁ  ed economy, which may 
be expected to be less prone to recessions.6
  Greater depth of the domestic ﬁ  nancial  (3) 
system. A common argument in favour 
of  ﬁ   nancial openness is that it increases 
the depth and breadth of domestic 
ﬁ  nancial markets and makes the ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation process more efﬁ  cient  by 
lowering costs and “excessive” proﬁ  ts 
associated with monopolistic or cartelised 
markets. For example, it is argued that 
foreign bank penetration may improve the 
quality and availability of ﬁ  nancial services 
and serve to foster the development of 
the domestic banking supervisory and 
legal framework. Furthermore, pre-crisis 
research had suggested that the cross-border 
diversiﬁ  cation of large banks improves the 
soundness of the banking system by making 
individual bank failures less likely.
However, the recent crisis has also shifted the 
focus of attention back to costs and the 
potentially destabilising impact of ﬁ  nancial 
integration. While costs and risks had been 
mostly discussed with regard to emerging 
economies, they also appear to be relevant for 
advanced economies and at the global level.7
  (1)  Costs from misallocation of resources. 
Cross-border  ﬂ   ows may be channelled 
to the less productive sectors and fuel 
domestic bubbles. For example, external 
credit may be channelled to non-tradable 
sectors, contributing to construction booms 
or supporting consumption over productive 
investment, in which case it is ultimately 
detrimental to the economy’s potential 
growth.
  Costs from pro-cyclicality and volatility of  (2) 
cross-border ﬂ  ows. Pro-cyclical and highly 
volatile short-term ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, including 
those owing to herding and contagion 
effects, may heighten the risk of economic 
and  ﬁ   nancial disruption, for example via 
a sudden halt in ﬂ  ows from foreign banks. 
Furthermore, large ﬁ  nancial  inﬂ  ows  may 
also have undesirable macroeconomic 
effects through other channels, including 
rapid monetary expansion (due to the 
difﬁ  culty and costs of pursuing sterilisation 
policies), inﬂ   ationary pressures (resulting 
from the effect of ﬁ  nancial  inﬂ  ows  on 
domestic spending and asset prices) and price 
competitiveness losses (through their impact 
on the real exchange rate). While, under 
a ﬂ  exible exchange rate, growing external 
deﬁ  cits may eventually lead to a realignment 
in relative prices and induce self-correcting 
movements in trade ﬂ   ows, under a ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate regime (or a monetary union 
for that matter), the continuous gradual 
losses in price competitiveness eventually 
erode the conﬁ   dence of investors in the 
long-term prospects of the economy. 
The self-adjustment mechanism, which 
should operate through the impact of current 
account deﬁ   cits on monetary aggregates, 
may be impaired or considerably delayed in 
the presence of ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows. 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2003). 4 
Giannetti and Ongena (2009). 5 
Manganelli and Povov (2010). 6 
For an early perspective on the challenges for and resilience  7 
of the global ﬁ  nancial system in the light of the globalisation 
process, see Greenspan (1997).12
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  (3)  Other potential costs. As discussed in 
Moutot and Vitale (2009), large cross-
border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows may have a sizeable 
impact on the price of assets by affecting 
both their supply and demand, as well as 
the premia that investors require to hold 
them (see in particular Bernanke (2007)). 
This in turn can contribute to making the 
link between money and prices unstable 
in the short to medium term, so that the 
direct interpretation of monetary aggregates 
becomes more difﬁ  cult. 
Finally, a more controversial element in the 
discussion is the extent to which ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows may be a destabilising force per se, or 
whether they merely represent a counterpart 
of other macroeconomic imbalances. For any 
given country with a current account deﬁ  cit, 
for instance, keeping reserves constant would 
mean that the country must cover its ﬁ  nancing 
needs by tapping international capital markets. 
Such an inﬂ  ow of capital may, however, protract 
(or aggravate) the current account imbalance. 
Similar questions could be posed at the global 
level. To what extent have the rise in global 
liquidity and in cross-border ﬂ  ows constituted 
an opportunity to raise ﬁ  nance and contributed 
to optimising intertemporal consumption? 
Could cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows have also 
destabilised the global economy and led to 
excessive current account divergence? What is 
the relationship between the increase in ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation and global imbalances, considering 
that the latter are persisting while international 
cross-border activity and global liquidity appear 
more subdued?  8
While these questions are beyond the scope of 
this paper, one has to recognise how closely 
these issues are interlinked.9 Similar arguments 
can also be made with regard to banking 
integration, where lack of transparency, wrong 
incentives, sub-optimal regulation and ﬂ  awed 
banking business models may have been the 
main source of ﬁ  nancial instability.10
For a discussion on how global imbalances, following a temporary  8 
correction that coincided with the ﬁ  nancial turmoil, may still pose 
signiﬁ  cant risks to the global economy, see ECB (2010b).
It has been argued for instance that the pre-crisis boom in the  9 
US real estate and securitisation markets reﬂ  ected to some extent 
the high foreign demand for safe assets resulting from “excess 
world savings” in the context of persistent global imbalances. 
Strong foreign demand for ﬁ  nancial assets not only pushed down 
the United States’ risk-free interest rate, but also compressed the 
risk premia on risky assets. The low cost of ﬁ  nancing fostered in 
turn an increase in the level of leverage of the domestic ﬁ  nancial 
sector, which exacerbated systemic risk.
Altunbas et al. (2011) analyse measures of bank distress during  10 
the recent turmoil for a large panel of institutions, showing there 
is a correlation with their pre-crisis business models. 13
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3   THE  FINANCIAL 




CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL INTEGRATION OF THE EURO AREA 
The EMU process and the subsequent introduction of the euro in 1999 had a catalytic effect on cross-
border ﬁ  nancial activity in Europe. In this box, we review the strong pre-crisis increase in intra-euro 
area ﬁ  nancial activity, go on to assess the geographical breakdown of euro area ﬁ  nancial assets and 
conclude by examining the impact of the crisis on different segments of euro area ﬁ  nancial markets. 
3  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND EURO AREA 
CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL FLOWS
This chapter describes the main trends of euro 
area cross-border direct, portfolio and other 
investment transactions prior to the crisis and 
thereafter. A stock analysis complements the 
ﬂ  ow analysis, while special issues, such as intra-
euro area ﬁ  nancial activity and the international 
dimension of bank deleveraging, are discussed 
in separate boxes.
3.1  MAIN TRENDS PRIOR TO THE CRISIS
Against the backdrop of increasing global 
ﬁ  nancial liberalisation and innovation and in line 
with similar developments in other advanced 
economies, euro area cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows 
strongly accelerated in the years prior to the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis (see Chart 6). This was reﬂ  ected 
both in increasing (net) purchases by euro area 
residents of foreign assets (captured by the 
asset side of the ﬁ  nancial account) and in rising 
ﬁ  nancial investment by non-residents in the euro 
area (captured by the liability side).11 However, 
the high correlation between the ﬂ  ows recorded 
on the asset side of the euro area ﬁ  nancial 
account and those recorded on the liability side  12 
had resulted in net ﬂ  ows being close to balance 
for most of the period since the introduction of 
the euro. 
The introduction of the euro in 1999 has 
certainly been another factor boosting euro area 
cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows.13 Relevant here is 
the increased international role of the euro and 
the growing international role of euro area 
banks. A remarkable feature is however, that in 
spite of all the globalisation trends and the rise 
of new opportunities in emerging markets, the 
introduction of the euro has fostered even 
stronger cross-border ﬁ   nancial integration in 
Europe (Box 1).14
Following the balance of payments convention, outﬂ  ows (e.g.  11 
increases in euro area residents’ assets abroad) are depicted with 
a negative sign, while inﬂ  ows are recorded with a positive sign.
For simplicity, we use the term “gross ﬂ  ows” when referring  12 
to the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows on either the asset or the liability sides of 
the ﬁ  nancial account separately, and the term “net ﬂ  ows” when 
referring to their balance.
De Santis (2010) argues that the monetary policy framework  13 
of the euro area and the establishment of EMU help explain 
the changes in portfolio asset allocation in the euro area over 
the turbulent period 1999-2001. For a pre-crisis comparison 
between the degree of ﬁ  nancial integration in Europe and Asia 
see Eichengreen and Park (2003).
For more details, see ECB (2008). 14 
Chart 6 Euro area financial account
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Intra-euro area ﬁ  nancial activity 
After the launch of the euro, foreign direct investment within the euro area increased, as the 
elimination of exchange rate risk and the reduction in transaction, ﬁ  xed and ﬁ  nancing costs 
facilitated the reallocation of capital among euro area countries, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector. The creation of common technological platforms, the potential beneﬁ   ts of greater 
diversiﬁ  cation and an appetite for higher expected returns were further factors that help explain 
the expansion of intra-euro area portfolio investment (see Chart A).
In terms of product composition, this phenomenon was broad-based as intra-euro area portfolio 
holdings increased, both in terms of equity and debt instruments (corporate and government 
bonds) (De Santis (2010), De Santis and Gerard (2009) and Baele et al. (2004)). Following the 
introduction of the euro, residents of the euro area diversiﬁ  ed their sovereign bond holdings 
across different euro area countries, thus contributing to the decline of yield spreads vis-à-vis 
German government bonds to very low levels (see Chart B) until the intensiﬁ  cation of the 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis in September 2008. The explanations generally put forward for this were: 
(i) the anchoring of inﬂ   ationary expectations owing to the credible common monetary 
policy; (ii) the elimination of exchange rate risk premia; (iii) positive conﬁ  dence effects of 
EMU membership on creditworthiness; and (iv) the progress made in some countries in real 
convergence (notwithstanding some concerns of rising risks of overheating). 
Over this period, intra-euro area bank exposure also increased remarkably, with euro area credit 
institutions increasingly allocating available savings to euro area countries, particularly those 
that needed to ﬁ  nance large, either public or private, debts. Countries such as Greece, Ireland, 
Chart A Intra-euro area portfolio holdings 
of debt and equity
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Sources: CPIS and ECB staff calculations.
Chart B Sovereign bond yield spreads of 
selected euro area countries



























Sources: Datastream and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Bond yield spreads vis-à-vis the German 10-year 
government bond. “AAA corp” denotes euro area AAArated 
corporate bond yields (maturity 7-10 years).15
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Italy, Portugal, and Spain, indeed attracted sizeable amounts of additional funds in the years 
prior to the crisis, mostly from German and French banks (see Chart C). This coincided with the 
period when German and French banks took a very active role internationally by expanding their 
cross-border operations as well as increasing lending through local subsidiaries and branches. 
This expansion was, however, even stronger within the euro area, with the claims of German and 
French banks on the aforementioned countries increasing from about 15% to about 20-25% of 
their total foreign claims (see Chart D).
Prior to the crisis increased intra-euro area ﬁ  nancial activity led to a further disconnect between 
domestic savings and investment (Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001)). Intra-euro area ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows, coupled with ﬂ  ows from the rest of the world, made possible the ﬁ  nancing of large current 
account deﬁ  cits in some member countries (European Commission (2009 and 2010)) for a 
prolonged period of time. While expectations of convergence and low ﬁ  nancing costs contributed 
to rising current account divergence in the euro area (Ca’ Zorzi and Rubaszek (2011)), structural 
reforms were often inadequate to support growth over long-term horizons. However, following 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis, the degree of segmentation of euro area bond markets increased, as pressures 
on sovereign debt intensiﬁ  ed in some countries.
A range of indicators show that, in euro area countries with large current account deﬁ  cits, the 
banking sector has acted as an intermediary, turning inﬂ  ows of capital into household and 
corporate debt. In many cases, relatively short-term ﬁ  nancing, in the form of cross-border 
deposits from the rest of the world (a more volatile source of ﬁ  nance than domestic deposits), 
has accounted for the largest part of the increase in the net external liability positions of the 
respective countries, while portfolio investment and, especially, foreign direct investment have 
played a secondary role (European Commission (2009)). 
Chart C Foreign claims of selected euro area 
countries vis-à-vis the group of countries 





























Sources: BIS consolidated banking statistics and ECB staff 
calculations.
Chart D Foreign claims of selected euro area 
countries vis-à-vis the group of countries 
comprising Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain




















Sources: BIS consolidated banking statistics and ECB staff 
calculations.16
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Geographical breakdown of euro area ﬁ  nancial assets
The increased ﬁ  nancial integration in the euro area was matched by the abundant ﬂ  ow of 
capital from the euro area countries to Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE). 
These  ﬂ   ows were particularly large and ﬁ   nanced sizeable current account deﬁ  cits  that 
persisted until the start of the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil, before reversing in some cases rather 
suddenly and sharply (Ca’ Zorzi et al. (2011)). Development of the ﬁ  nancial sector and the 
widespread ownership by euro area banks of the CESEE banks appear to have contributed 
signiﬁ  cantly to boosting credit growth and supporting economic activity in several CESEE 
countries before the crisis (Gardo and Martin (2010)). As the crisis unfolded, however, these 
factors had stabilising effects, as parent banks had the incentive to preserve the viability of 
their subsidiary banks. Moreover the European Bank Coordination Initiative, known as the 
“Vienna initiative”, appears to have helped limit the degree of retrenchment of the euro area 
banking sector, particularly from the subsidiaries and ofﬁ  ces situated in the most vulnerable 
countries, where IMF/EU programmes were already in place (Cetorelli and Golberg 
(2011), Constâncio (2010), Ostry et al. (2010), Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) and De Haas 
et al. (2011)). 
Although the ﬂ  ows to CESEE were important for the recipient economies and for the balance 
sheets of individual euro area parent banks, for the euro area as a whole they represented a small 
fraction of its international exposure, as illustrated by the geographical breakdown of euro area 
ﬁ  nancial assets (see Chart E). Euro area ﬁ  nancial assets prior to the crisis were indeed mostly 
held vis-à-vis other major advanced economies, primarily the United Kingdom and the United 
States, as well as offshore ﬁ  nancial centres. This geographical distribution did not change with 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis.
Impact of the crisis on different segments 
of euro area ﬁ  nancial markets
The crisis affected the various sectors of the 
ﬁ  nancial markets in Europe to very different 
degrees (ECB (2010a)). The most integrated 
ones, such as the money markets, showed clear 
signs of retrenchment within national borders. 
The bond and retail banking markets, by 
contrast, were less affected, but also witnessed 
some strains. As the ﬁ  nancial crisis unfolded 
and ﬁ  scal problems in some European countries 
escalated, the process of euro area ﬁ  nancial 
integration, in particular of sovereign bond 
markets, witnessed a partial moderation in 
2009 (Balli et al. (2010)). Sovereign bond yield 
spreads (vis-à-vis the German bond) widened 
across euro area countries, while foreign and 
resident investors displayed ﬂ  ight-to-quality 
behaviour, inﬂ   uenced by a reassessment of 
borrower’s creditworthiness, partly reshufﬂ  ing 
Chart E Geographical breakdown of euro 
area financial assets by main instrument, 




































Sources: ECB staff calculations. The EU-8 aggregate includes 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania.17
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A broad overview of the ﬁ  nancial account since 
1999 allows one to trace the main trends in the 
euro area balance of payments (see Chart 7). 
A persistent feature has been that the euro 
area has received, repeatedly over the years, 
net inﬂ   ows of portfolio investment that have 
been counterbalanced by net outﬂ  ows of direct 
investment. 
Direct investment was largely driven by equity 
capital and, secondarily, by re-invested earnings 
and other capital, the latter consisting mainly of 
inter-company loans.15 Portfolio investment 
generally reﬂ  ected inﬂ  ows in both equities and 
bonds and notes, while money market 
instruments (i.e. debt securities with an initial 
maturity of less than one year) accounted for a 
relatively minor share of total net portfolio 
investment ﬂ  ows in most years (see Chart 8). 
Financial derivatives  16 and ofﬁ  cial  reserves 
typically played a minor role. Finally, other 
investment, a residual component in the ﬁ  nancial 
account mostly comprising loans, currency and 
deposits  17, was more volatile, being large and 
positive (i.e. net inﬂ  ows) in 1999 and 2000 and 
sizeable and mostly negative (i.e. net outﬂ  ows) 
over the period from 2002 to 2007 
(see Chart 9). 
The “other capital” category of direct investment covers all  15 
ﬁ  nancial transactions (borrowing and lending of funds) between 
direct investors and their subsidiaries, branches and associates. 
In the case of transactions between afﬁ  liated banks (monetary 
ﬁ  nancial institutions (MFIs)), or special-purpose entities (SPEs) 
whose sole purpose is to act as a ﬁ  nancial intermediary (e.g. 
brokers), and other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, direct investment 
transactions are conﬁ  ned to those that are permanent in nature 
(debt or equity).
Financial derivatives include options, futures, swaps, forward  16 
foreign exchange contracts and credit derivatives.
Other investment includes all ﬁ  nancial transactions not covered  17 
by direct investment, portfolio investment, ﬁ  nancial derivatives 
or reserve assets. It can be sub-divided into (i) trade credits, 
(ii) loans, currency and deposits and (iii) other assets/other 
liabilities. Repo-type agreements that are treated as collateralised 
loans in the balance of payments statistics are also included.
their portfolios to increase the weight of speciﬁ  c euro area government bonds (ECB (2010a)).1 
Meanwhile, the ﬁ   nancial crisis revealed some potentially destabilising effects of strong 
intra-euro area, and more broadly intra-European, bank linkages, since the latter acted as 
transmission channels, amplifying and propagating the shock and turning it into a systemic 
event. Finally, equity markets did not show any appreciable retreat from cross-border integration, 
possibly owing to institutional features such as the fact that they are more transparent and more 
liquid than debt markets.
All in all, the reversal of some volatile and short-term forms of ﬁ  nance made countries that had 
heavily relied on these ﬂ  ows highly vulnerable to changing global ﬁ  nancial conditions and less 
able to sustain their external asset positions. 
1  For more details on the impact of the crisis on euro area debt market as a whole, see Section 4.
Chart 7 Components of the euro area 
financial account































Note: Inﬂ  ows (+); outﬂ  ows (-).18
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3.2  THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS
Although the size, direction and composition of 
net ﬂ  ows is what matters from a macroeconomic 
perspective (for aggregate demand, monetary 
aggregates and exchange rate developments), 
netting out assets and liabilities may lead 
to a loss of valuable information that might 
otherwise help gauge investors’ motivations. 
For example, while an increase in net inﬂ  ows in 
equities may reﬂ  ect an increase of investment in 
euro area equities by non-residents, it can also 
reﬂ  ect the liquidation of equity positions abroad 
and the repatriation of funds by residents. 
Understanding these differences is important 
to accurately interpret international investors’ 
incentives and capital movements, especially in 
periods of turmoil. 
It is worth noting that the crisis has affected euro 
area asset and liability ﬂ  ows on a much larger 
scale than net ﬂ  ows (see Chart 10), reﬂ  ecting 
the process of reduction or, in many cases, 
reversal of cross-border ﬁ  nancial investment by 
resident and non-resident investors. A similar 
conclusion may be drawn from developments in 
the ﬁ  nancial accounts of other major advanced 
economies, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom (see Chart 11). 
Chart 9 Other investment by institution


























Chart 8 Portfolio investment by instrument
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Source: ECB.
Notes: MMIs stands for “money market instruments”. Inﬂ  ows 
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The ratio of euro area external assets to GDP, 
as well as that of euro area external liabilities 
to GDP after reaching the level of 23% in both 
cases (€2 trillion) in 2007, fell to about 5% in 
2008 and just 2% in 2009. Net ﬂ  ows which, for 
comparison, were close to balance (€3 billion) 
in 2007, amounted to just 1.3% of GDP in 
2008 and fell to 0.3% in 2009, in line with the 
developments in the current account balance 
(see Chart 10). 
These ﬁ  gures show that: (i) asset and liability 
ﬂ   ows can be far larger than net ﬂ  ows, 
(ii) external ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows can be volatile and 
easily reversible under certain conditions  18 and 
(iii) low net ﬂ  ows may mask the gradual build 
up of macroeconomic imbalances and ﬁ  nancial 
risks. The larger the ratio of assets or liabilities 
to GDP, the more vulnerable a country is to 
abrupt changes in ﬁ  nancial market conditions 
and to adverse wealth and balance sheet shocks. 
Indeed, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 and the ensuing intensiﬁ  cation 
and synchronisation of the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis marked a break in the surge of gross 
cross-border  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows. In the euro area 
a sizeable scaling down of external ﬁ  nancial 
transactions by both residents and non-
residents was recorded in 2008 (see Charts 6 
and 10), which was evident across the whole 
range of investment instruments. The only 
exceptions were investment in euro area debt by 
non-residents and inter-company loans abroad 
by residents, which both increased (see Tables 1 
and 2 in the Annex). 
A number of extraordinary circumstances 
ampliﬁ   ed the reduction in gross cross-border 
investment – and in some cases resulted in 
disinvestment by euro area residents and 
non-residents during the crisis. First, liquidity 
shortages owing to the breakdown of the 
interbank and asset-backed securities markets 
triggered initially signiﬁ  cant  (ﬁ   re) sales of 
A study by Broner et al. (2010) ﬁ   nds that for high-income  18 
countries during the 2000s, the volatility of gross ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows is signiﬁ  cantly higher than that of net ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows. For 
example, the median standard deviation of gross inﬂ  ows from 
abroad increased to 9.16 in the 2000s from 2.66 during the 
1970s, while the volatility of net ﬂ  ows increased from 2.41 in the 
1970s to 3.60 in the 2000s.
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other assets to raise cash. Second, heightened 
uncertainty and asymmetric information 
between lenders and borrowers resulted in 
a sudden rise in risk aversion, which led to 
a certain amount of herd behaviour among 
international investors. Third, extensive balance 
sheet restructuring in both the ﬁ  nancial  and 
non-ﬁ   nancial sectors, triggered partly by 
solvency concerns, induced a further decrease in 
euro area cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows.
The prominent role of sudden gyrations in 
markets’ risk perceptions, conﬁ  dence  and 
tolerance during this ﬁ  nancial crisis episode has 
recently attracted attention in the literature as 
a determinant of cross-border activity (Forbes 
and Warnock (2011)). It has been argued that part 
of the rise in market risk that emerged in the last 
quarter of 2008 (see Chart 12) can be explained 
by shifts in the risk assessment of current as well 
as future asset prices, in an environment of large 
negative wealth shocks, weak fundamentals and 
economic and ﬁ  nancial imbalances (Bacchetta 
et al. (2010)). This suggests that some degree 
of additional immeasurable risk, referred to as 
Knightian uncertainty, might have intensiﬁ  ed 
the typical risk aversion behaviour seen during 
times of high risk, leading to a broadly-based 
loss of conﬁ   dence on the part of investors 
(Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008)).
Taken together, these three factors not only 
led to a scaling down of gross cross-border 
direct investment, portfolio investment and 
other investment, they also resulted in changes 
in the composition of euro area cross-border 
portfolio ﬂ  ows. 
3.2.1 SHIFTS IN THE COMPOSITION 
OF PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
As the global ﬁ  nancial turmoil that started in 
mid-2007 developed into a full-blown crisis in 
2008, investors shifted from (i) equity to debt 
instruments (ﬂ  ight to safety), (ii) long-term to 
short-term debt instruments and (iii) private 
sector securities to public sector debt. 
While euro area residents engaged in large-scale 
portfolio disinvestment abroad and repatriation 
of funds, foreign investors continued to 
purchase portfolio assets in the euro area, albeit 
at a decelerating pace (see Chart 13). 
This mainly reﬂ  ected developments in the debt 
market. Foreign investors purchased sizeable 
amounts of euro area money market instruments, 
Chart 12 Risk dynamics during the crisis
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Sources: Datastream and ECB staff calculations. 
Notes: The market risk measure on the left-hand side refers to the CBOE SPX volatility VIX index. The volatility of market risk is the 
30-day standard deviation of the VIX index. See Bacchetta, Tille and van Wincoop (2010). Last observation refers to May 2011.21
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which more than offset their reduced investment 
in euro area bonds and notes (see Chart 14). 
Euro area investors, by contrast, decreased 
signiﬁ  cantly their purchases of both long and 
short-term debt instruments abroad as a result of 
increased home bias (see Chart 15).19
The shift in foreign investors’ preferences away 
from assets with longer-term maturity (bonds and 
notes) to safer and more liquid short-term assets 
(money market instruments), was accompanied 
by a move away from debt issued by euro 
area MFIs to government debt, both long-term 
and short-term (see Chart 16). In particular, 
foreigners strongly disinvested in MFI bonds 
in the fourth quarter of 2008 and in the ﬁ  rst 
three quarters of 2009, in spite of government 
guarantees for such securities, possibly due to 
growing uncertainty about the extent of the euro 
area banking sector’s exposure to “toxic” assets 
and fears of systemic spillovers. 
At the same time, investors withdrew from 
equity markets in the midst of the crisis. Foreign 
investors’ large disinvestment in euro area 
See, also, the box entitled “Financial integration and the ﬁ  nancial  19 
crisis in 2008: a cross-border portfolio allocation perspective”, 
Monthly Bulletin, ECB, May 2010.
Chart 13 Portfolio assets and liabilities 
of the euro area























Note: Inﬂ  ows (+); outﬂ  ows (-).
Chart 14 Non-euro area residents’ investment in euro area bonds and notes and money 
market instruments, by issuing sector
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equities in the second half of 2008 and the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2009 was concentrated on non-MFI 
sectors, while euro area investors also liquidated 
equity investments abroad (see Chart 17).
As risk aversion surged, increasing home 
bias and stronger preferences for safer and 
more liquid assets became the main drivers 
of the developments in cross-border portfolio 
ﬂ  ows during the crisis. Other factors – such as 
interest rate differentials – that traditionally 
had played a major role in explaining bond 
ﬂ   ows seemed less relevant (see Chart 18). 
Meanwhile, the halt of the convergence process 
in euro area bond markets, as evidenced by 
widening government bond spreads, implied 
that country-speciﬁ  c risk factors were playing 
an increasing role. Equity ﬂ  ows, by contrast, 
remained broadly in line with relative stock 
price developments in the euro area and other 
major  ﬁ   nancial centres, such as the United 
States (see Chart 19), but have largely suffered 
from a highly synchronised stock market 
downturn worldwide and from the adverse 
impact of persistent global risk factors.
3.2.2 DELEVERAGING IN OTHER INVESTMENT
In other investment, which mainly comprises 
loans and deposits, signiﬁ  cant  cross-border 
Chart 15 Euro area residents’ investment by sector in bonds and notes and money market 
instruments abroad
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Source: ECB.
Notes: MFIs stands for “monetary ﬁ  nancial institutions”. Last observation refers to Q4 2010. Inﬂ  ows (+); outﬂ  ows (-).
Chart 16 Non-euro area residents’ investment 
in euro area debt (by issuing sector)
(EUR billions; annual ﬂ  ows)






















Notes: MFIs stands for “monetary ﬁ   nancial institutions”; the 
Eurosystem is excluded, as it does not issue debt securities.23
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deleveraging activity by euro area residents 
and non-residents has been particularly evident 
(see Chart 20). 
After showing a strong upward trend prior to the 
crisis, with annual ﬂ   ows rising from about 
€150 billion in 2003 to about €600 billion 
Chart 17 Cross-border investment in equities
(EUR billions; quarterly ﬂ  ows)













































Notes: MFIs stands for “monetary ﬁ  nancial institutions”. Last observation refers to Q4 2010. Inﬂ  ows (+); outﬂ  ows (-).
Chart 18 Bond yield differentials
(EUR billions; 12-month cumulated ﬂ  ows)
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Note: Last observation refers to February 2011.
Chart 19 Equity return differentials
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in 2007, the accumulation of external assets and 
liabilities by the euro area MFI sector was 
abruptly reversed in late 2008 and at the beginning 
of 2009 (see Charts 21 and 22). The strong 
co-movement in MFI asset and liability ﬂ  ows 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world, largely conﬁ  rms 
that business was conducted mainly between 
banks, either with their own afﬁ  liates abroad or 
with other banks.20 Against the background of 
strong global ﬁ  nancial interlinkages and intensive 
cross-border interbank activity, liquidity 
shortages and global uncertainty induced a sizeable 
retrenchment of MFIs’ external loans and deposits 
in 2008. At the same time, monetary authorities 
around the globe activated foreign currency swap 
lines in 2008 to address elevated pressures in 
foreign exchange markets (see Box 2).
From a euro area balance of payments perspective, however,  20 
the sizeable deleveraging by euro-area MFIs seen in gross terms 
(assets or liabilities) has been less pronounced in net terms, 
because banks’ gross cross-border liabilities to foreigners and 
gross cross-border claims on foreigners have co-moved at about 
the same rate.
Chart 20 Other investment assets and 
liabilities of the euro area
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Chart 21 Other investment external assets 
of euro area MFIs and non-MFIs



















Notes: Last observation refers to Q4 2010. Inﬂ  ows  (+); 
outﬂ  ows (-). Non-MFIs include ﬁ  nancial institutions other than 
banks, such as hedge funds, insurance funds and pension funds, 
and the rest of the private sector, i.e. households and private 
corporations.
Chart 22 Other investment external 
liabilities of euro area MFIs and non-MFIs
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THE ECB’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE LIQUIDITY-PROVIDING OPERATIONS
From the onset of the crisis in mid-2007 until mid-2008, the signiﬁ  cant foreign exchange liquidity 
needs of the euro area banks have been covered by banks located abroad – usually the US or UK 
ofﬁ  ces of euro area-owned banks – lending to their afﬁ  liated ofﬁ  ces in the euro area (often the 
parent ofﬁ  ce). When the crisis intensiﬁ  ed in September 2008 and cash shortages emerged, central 
banks began to play a key role in providing liquidity in currencies other than the euro. In response 
to elevated pressures in the US dollar funding markets, the ECB agreed a temporary reciprocal 
currency arrangement (swap line) with the Federal Reserve that enabled the ECB to conduct US 
dollar liquidity-providing operations with its counterparties against Eurosystem-eligible collateral. 
A similar swap line was activated between the ECB and the Swiss National Bank in October 2008 
in order to enable the ECB to provide Swiss franc liquidity to euro area banks, if needed.
Although these operations, and most notably the US dollar liquidity ones, resulted in a rapid 
increase in the Eurosystem’s external liabilities in the “other investment” item of the balance of 
payments in 2008 (see Chart), they were counterbalanced by an increase in the external assets 
held by resident MFIs and eventually by a decrease in their external liabilities, in particular 
the ones denominated in foreign currency. As a result, the US ofﬁ  ces of many euro area banks 
were able to decrease their lending position to their parents and, in the fourth quarter of 2008, 
they actually received a ﬂ  ow of funds back into the United States, possibly due to heightened 
difﬁ  culties in the US market. 
An unwinding of the US dollar liquidity-
providing operations took place in 2009, which 
was reﬂ  ected in a decrease in the liabilities of 
the Eurosystem of almost the same size as the 
interventions of late 2008. 
In January 2010, the swap line with the Swiss 
National Bank was discontinued. However, 
in May 2010 the ECB decided to reactivate, 
in coordination with other central banks, the 
temporary US dollar liquidity swap facilities, 
which had been earlier discontinued, as a 
response to the re-emergence of strains in 
US dollar short-term funding markets. Finally, 
in December 2010, the ECB and the Bank of 
England announced, within the framework 
of central bank cooperation, a temporary 
liquidity swap facility, under which the Bank 
of England could provide, if necessary, pound 
sterling to the ECB in exchange for euro. 
The impact of all the above-mentioned foreign 
exchange liquidity-providing operations in 
2010 on the Eurosystem’s external liabilities 
has been marginal.
Other investment by sector
























Notes: MFIs stands for “monetary ﬁ  nancial institutions”. Inﬂ  ows 
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The deleveraging process was apparent also 
in the non-bank sector (see Charts 21 and 22). 
Prior to the crisis, loans granted to foreigners 
and deposits held abroad (asset side) and 
loans received from abroad (liability side) 
by euro area non-bank entities had risen at a 
strong pace. Annual ﬂ   ows in foreign assets 
increased from less than €100 billion in 2004 
to around €400 billion in 2007, while ﬂ  ows in 
foreign liabilities increased from €35 billion to 
more than €200 billion over the same period. 
The deceleration in 2008 was more pronounced 
for external assets than for external liabilities.
3.2.3 RESILIENCE OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
An interesting feature of the ﬁ  nancial crisis has 
been that foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
been more resilient than other forms of private 
capital. Thus, FDI ﬂ   ows in 2008/9 remained 
close to their pre-crisis long-term averages 
(see Chart 23). 
Euro area FDI investment abroad decelerated, 
but weathered the crisis relatively well, while 
inward FDI in the euro area was affected more 
strongly in 2008. The most pronounced drop was 
in direct investment from the United Kingdom, 
followed by that from the United States 
(see Chart 25).
The resilience of outward FDI by euro area 
residents could partly reﬂ  ect  engagement 
in projects of a longer-term nature or with 
higher  ﬁ   xed costs, and thus the difﬁ  culty  of 
withdrawing from longer-term commitments. 
Meanwhile, the rather strong euro exchange rate 
may have encouraged some euro area ﬁ  rms to 
buy assets abroad, while making inward FDI 
rather expensive.
Data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As), the main mode of FDI, conﬁ  rm 
the deceleration observed in euro area 
direct investment in the last couple of years 
(see Chart 24). The value of these deals declined 
in 2008 and 2009, as compared with the pre-
crisis period. M&As in manufacturing and in the 
non-bank ﬁ  nancial sector recorded the sharpest 
fall, while those in services increased, the 
latter possibly reﬂ  ecting buy-out opportunities 
resulting from the crisis. 
Chart 23 Foreign direct investment abroad 
and in the euro area
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Source: ECB.
Note: Inﬂ  ows (+); outﬂ  ows (-).
Chart 24 M&As by the rest of the world 
in the euro area, by target sector
(EUR billions; period sums)
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The main factor behind the moderation in FDI 
ﬂ   ows was, according to ﬁ   rm level data, the 
deterioration in the ﬁ  nancing capability of ﬁ  rms. 
The tightening of credit conditions and the 
higher cost of capital hampered companies’ 
access to external ﬁ   nancing, while the lower 
proﬁ   tability and stock market value of their 
assets reduced the availability of own funds for 
investment at home and abroad. At the same 
time, the uncertainty surrounding global 
economic prospects had a dampening effect on 
ﬁ  rms’ propensity to invest, with a preference for 
partnerships and licensing as opposed to equity 
investments, as means of international 
expansion.21 Multinational ﬁ  rms also accelerated 
their repatriation of proﬁ   ts, opting against 
reinvestment. In some cases, disinvestment was 
observed, as troubled ﬁ  rms  and  ﬁ  nancial 
institutions raised capital by selling their 
overseas assets, usually to local companies. 
Finally, a drop in leveraged buy-out transactions 
by private-equity funds from many countries 
served to further dampen inward cross-border 
M&As, which in turn further depressed euro 
area FDI inﬂ  ows.
3.3  THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS AND 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As the global economy started to show signs of 
stabilisation in 2009, some of the trends in gross 
cross-border  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows observed during 
the peak of the crisis abated or even started to 
reverse. There was a general resumption of ﬂ  ows, 
although they remained at signiﬁ  cantly  lower 
levels than in the pre-crisis period from 2005 to 
2007. In some cases, such as portfolio investment 
abroad by euro area residents, cross-border ﬂ  ows 
stabilised at well below their historical annual 
average levels. 
In more detail, portfolio investment in debt 
instruments lost some of its appeal in 2009, 
particularly for non-resident investors. 
The more favourable global economic outlook 
and improved ﬁ  nancial  market  conditions 
resulted in a partial rebound in investors’ 
risk appetite, encouraging them to invest 
in equities in the euro area and abroad. 
However, in the ﬁ  rst half of 2010 risk aversion 
re-emerged, amid high volatility, due to the 
re-intensiﬁ  cation  of  ﬁ   nancial market tensions, 
especially in Europe, in May. Indeed, during 
the second quarter of 2010, developments were 
largely driven by increased home bias on the part 
of euro area residents, who engaged in a process 
of liquidation of positions in foreign bonds and 
equities and repatriation of funds. In the second 
half of 2010 non-residents signiﬁ  cantly decreased 
their purchases of euro area debt instruments; in 
particular, they sold euro area bonds and notes in 
the third quarter of 2010 amid market concerns 
related to the sustainability of the sovereign debt 
of some euro area countries, only resuming their 
purchases in the fourth quarter as tensions eased. 
In contrast, euro area residents increased their 
purchases of debt instruments abroad somewhat. 
Equity investment accelerated in the second 
half of 2010, rebounding from the low levels 
observed in the ﬁ   rst half of the year, mainly 
reﬂ  ecting higher investment in euro area equities 
by foreign investors. Euro area investors also 
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  21 
(2009).
Chart 25 Euro area FDI inflows, 





























Notes: Last observation refers to Q4 2010. “other” is calculated 
as a residual and includes inﬂ   ows from other countries, 
international organisations and offshore ﬁ  nancial centres. CEECs 
stands for “central and eastern European countries” and BRICs 
stands for “Brazil, Russia, India and China”.28
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started to invest in foreign equities again in an 
environment of rising stock market prices and 
declining market volatility.
Meanwhile, the process of deleveraging continued 
at a signiﬁ  cant rate in 2009 in relation to cross-
border loans and deposits. For the ﬁ  rst time since 
the introduction of the euro, the euro area’s gross 
other investment ﬂ  ows recorded declines on both 
the asset and liability sides in 2009 (see Chart 20), 
before modestly resuming in 2010.
As regards the euro area banking sector, the 
need to strengthen capital positions – in an 
environment of more prudent lending standards 
and pressure from the supervisory authorities 
to keep leverage levels under tight control – 
and reduce international risk exposure largely 
accounted for the continued reduction in the 
foreign assets (mostly loans granted abroad) 
of MFIs (see Chart 21). At the same time, the 
desire to refocus balance sheet risk may have 
been the reason for a higher acquisition of other 
assets, like government securities, at least until 
the third quarter of 2009. On the liability side, 
foreign investors continued to withdraw deposits 
held with euro area MFIs (see Chart 22). Given 
that euro area MFIs form an integral and 
core part of the global ﬁ  nancial system, their 
cross-border activity has been fundamental in 
the process of global deleveraging. Against this 
background, Box 3 provides further insight into 
euro-area bank deleveraging by discussing it 
from a global perspective. 
Similarly, a fully ﬂ  edged deleveraging process 
also started in the euro area non-MFI sector, in 
2009 (see Charts 21 and 22). For the ﬁ  rst time 
since the introduction of the euro, the non-MFI 
sector recorded net sales of its external assets 
and a reduction in its external liabilities. This 
development is likely to have been the combined 
result of: (i) balance sheet adjustment and debt 
repayment, (ii) a shift from (foreign) bank loans 
to market-based fund raising,22 due to improved 
sentiment in ﬁ  nancial markets, as evidenced by 
the rebound in equity prices (demand-side 
effect) and (iii) a reduction by foreign banks in 
their cross-border lending (supply-side effect). 
See the box entitled “Integrated euro area accounts for the third  22 
quarter of 2009”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, February 2010.
Box 3 
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF BANK 
DELEVERAGING
An important channel through which 
the  ﬁ   nancial crisis has been propagated 
internationally has been the sizeable reduction 
in the foreign claims of banks active in 
global  ﬁ   nancial markets. As the turmoil 
reached its peak, banks reporting to the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
reduced their global exposure by 18%, from 
USD 30.4 trillion in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2008 
to USD 25.0 trillion in the fourth quarter of 
2008 on a consolidated basis (see Chart A). 
Around 70% of this reduction was achieved by 
cutting cross-border claims, mostly comprising 
international loans, while the remaining 30% 
resulted from a reduction in the local claims 
Chart A Foreign claims of BIS reporting 
countries (cross-border and local lending)
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cross-border claims
local claims of foreign offices in all currencies
Sources: BIS and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Consolidated data. The last observation refers to the fourth 
quarter of 2010.29
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of foreign subsidiaries. Between March 2009 
and the fourth quarter of 2010 the total foreign 
claims of BIS reporting countries broadly 
stabilised at a level of around USD 25 trillion. 
In line with the global nature of the ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil, the deleveraging process was highly 
synchronised across countries in the period 
between March 2008 and December 2008, 
affecting almost all major developed and 
emerging economies. Over this period, 
foreign claims were reduced vis-à-vis the 
United States by USD 866 billion (-13%) and 
the United Kingdom by USD 1 trillion (-27%), 
as shown by the reddish brown bars in Chart B. 
The reduction was particularly sizeable 
vis-à-vis the euro area countries, USD 2.1 trillion 
(-20%), partly reﬂ  ecting a fall in intra-euro area 
ﬁ  nancial claims. From a systemic point of view, 
the decline in banks’ international exposure 
to emerging market economies by almost 
half a trillion US dollars was also particularly 
relevant, with Asia appearing to be the most 
affected region during the early stages of the 
crisis. From the fourth quarter of 2008 onward, 
developments have been more idiosyncratic. 
Although BIS banks increased their exposure 
to (non-European) emerging markets to levels 
even higher than those prevailing prior to the 
turmoil, they continued to cut foreign claims 
on the United States and euro area countries 
(see the blue bars in Chart B).
Particularly relevant is that banks of the largest 
euro area countries have continued to retrench 
internationally, returning, for example, to 
the levels of exposure of 2005 in the case of 
Germany and of 2007 in the case of France 
(see Chart C).1
A sectoral decomposition of banking claims 
also allows one to get a better insight into the 
nature of the international bank deleveraging 
process. While between March 2008 and 
December 2010 BIS banks increased their 
1  Avdjiev et al. (2011) report breaks in the series for both Germany and France, including in the light of the transfer of claims to asset 
management companies that do not report to the BIS. These however do not affect the broad picture that German and French banks 
continued to reduce their international ﬁ  nancial exposure (the breaks are also smaller in consolidated terms).
Chart B Change in foreign claims of BIS 
reporting countries vis-à-vis selected 
geographical regions
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Sources: BIS and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Consolidated data. For the euro area (EA) the last 
observation refers to Q4 2010.
Chart C Foreign claims of BIS reporting 
countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
(selected euro area countries)






























Sources: BIS and ECB staff calculations.
Notes: Consolidated data. The last observation refers to Q4 of 
2010.30
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In 2010, however, deleveraging in relation to 
cross-border loans and deposits lost momentum 
and there were some signs of normalisation of 
ﬂ  ows both on the asset and on the liability sides, 
as euro area residents resumed investing abroad 
and non-residents resumed investing in the euro 
area. The size of international ﬂ  ows of other 
investment, however, remained very subdued.
Finally, direct investment – which, as discussed, 
moderated but proved more resilient than other 
ﬂ   ows of private capital during the crisis – 
showed some signs of recovery in 2009. 
Inward direct investment picked up again 
but remained substantially muted, especially 
that part stemming from the United Kingdom 
and the United States (see Chart 26). At the 
same time direct investment by euro area 
residents abroad stabilised. In 2010 as a whole, 
direct investment again moderated, particularly 
that carried out in the euro area by foreign 
investors. 
exposure vis-à-vis the public sector by 7.0% 
(USD 0.3 trillion), the deleveraging process 
vis-à-vis other banks and the private sector 
was sizeable (see Chart D). Overall BIS banks 
reduced their foreign claims vis-à-vis other 
banks by one third (about USD 2.9 trillion) and 
their foreign claims vis-à-vis the private sector 
by one sixth (USD 2.9 trillion) from the peak 
levels of March 2008. Notwithstanding this 
sizeable fall in foreign claims on the private 
sector, the latter remains by far the largest 
sector to which the banking sector is exposed 
(USD 14.3 trillion in December 2010). 
Moreover, the share of BIS bank exposure to 
the private sector increased by 3 percentage 
points (to reach 59% of their total exposure) 
between March 2008 and December 2010. 
Over the same period the exposure to the 
public sector increased by 500 basis points, to 
reach 19% while that to other banks declined 
by a similar amount to 24%.
Part of the process of global bank deleveraging can be viewed as a necessary adjustment of loan-
to-deposit ratios after several years of rapid credit expansion at the global level. The decline 
is also consistent with the sharp slowdown observed in global economic activity. However, a 
prolonged period of subdued foreign lending to the private sector could also signal a phase of 
general weakness in the banking sector, which may be partly reﬂ  ected in banks’ willingness to 
lend domestically.  
In summary, the global economy has witnessed a signiﬁ  cant retrenchment of the banking sector 
from global markets, which has reﬂ  ected the severity of the ﬁ  nancial turmoil, but also contributed 
to the spread of its impact internationally. Although the deleveraging process is not yet over for 
all countries and all sectors, there are signs of stabilisation, which is important if the global 
recovery is to be durable.  
Chart D Foreign claims of BIS reporting 
countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world, 
by sector

























Sources: BIS and ECB staff calculations.
Note: Consolidated data, based on headquarter principle.31
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3.4  INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION
Apart from the impact on cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ   ows, the crisis has also affected ﬁ  nancial 
stocks, i.e. the international investment position 
(i.i.p.). The change in the i.i.p. is primarily 
explained by two factors: (i) net ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows 
and (ii) revaluations due to changes in exchange 
rates and asset prices and other adjustments. 
In the years prior to the crisis, the net i.i.p. of 
the euro area was gradually deteriorating, its net 
liability position reaching a peak of €1.7 trillion 
(or 17.9% of GDP) in 2008, before narrowing 
to €1.5 trillion (or 16.4% of GDP) in 2009 and 
€1.2 trillion (or 13.0% of GDP) in 2010. 
The United States and the United Kingdom 
also recorded net liability positions during the 
same period, which peaked in 2008 and 2006, 
respectively (see Chart 26).
While revaluation effects almost exclusively 
explained the deterioration in the net i.i.p. of the 
euro area in 2006 and 2007, the transaction 
effect, i.e. the contribution of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, 
increased markedly, to one third of the 
deterioration in the i.i.p. of the euro area in 2008 
(see Chart 27). These net inﬂ  ows were mainly 
driven, as seen above, by strong net purchases 
of debt securities, which were only partly offset 
by net sales of equities. In addition, the negative 
revaluations due to the appreciation of the euro 
and other adjustments  23 were only partly offset 
by positive asset price changes, so that the euro 
area’s net liability position deteriorated further.
As international economic conditions started to 
normalise in 2009 and 2010, the impact of net 
ﬁ  nancial transactions on the change in the euro 
area’s i.i.p. became smaller (but still negative), 
as it was offset by large and positive revaluation 
effects predominantly arising from asset price 
and exchange rate changes. Despite the fact 
that the euro area’s net i.i.p. improved in 2009 
and 2010, underlying sectoral shifts in the net 
The other adjustments mainly reﬂ  ected the introduction of a new  23 
data collection system for portfolio investment in one euro area 
country.
Chart 26 Net i.i.p. of selected advanced 
economies
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Source: ECB.
Note: Last observation refers to 2010, except for the United States 
(2009).
Chart 27 Breakdown of changes in the euro 
area net i.i.p.
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external lending/borrowing of the euro area 
suggest some downside risks.
The integrated euro area accounts, available 
up to the fourth quarter of 2010, show that net 
external borrowing by general government has 
been steadily rising since 2008. At the same 
time, net borrowing by private non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporations has been falling, suggesting 
reduced needs for capital and changes in 
the cash management of companies. In the 
course of 2010, general government became 
the only sector in the euro area to be a net 
borrower from abroad (see Chart 28), although 
non-ﬁ  nancial corporations returned to a small 
net borrowing position in the fourth quarter 
of the year. This means that the external 
dependence of the euro area governments and 
their vulnerability to interest rate risks has 
increased. A similar picture emerges from the 
analysis of developments in the euro area’s 
gross external debt (see Box 4).
Chart 28 Sector contributions to the 
euro area’s external net lending/borrowing

























Source: ECB, Integrated Euro Area Accounts.
Note: Last observation refers to Q4 2010. Net lender (+)/ 
net borrower (-).
Box 4
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EURO AREA’S GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT  1
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis was associated with an increase in gross external debt in most of the 
major advanced economies, including the euro area. Over the period 2006 to 2009, the gross 
external debt of the general government sector in the euro area increased by 8.4 percentage 
points of GDP to around 21% of GDP at the end of 2009. In the United States, however, the 
increase was more pronounced (9.4 percentage points of GDP) and the gross external debt of 
general government at the end of 2009 was higher than in the euro area, amounting to about 26% 
of GDP (see Table). This increase in the gross debt positions of general government in major 
advanced economies was partly driven by higher ﬁ  nancing needs on the part of governments as 
a result of the crisis, but also by heightened global risk aversion on the part of investors, which 
led them to invest in low-risk ﬁ  nancial assets, such as the sovereign debt securities of selected 
advanced economies. 
The net external debt position of the euro area at the end of 2009 (12.6% of GDP) was signiﬁ  cantly 
lower than its gross external debt position and well below the net positions of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. The net interest payments of the euro area amounted to 0.2% of GDP 
in 2009, a signiﬁ  cantly lower level than in the United States and the United Kingdom where they 
were 1.3% of GDP.
1  For an extensive analysis of the gross external debt statistics of the euro area as a whole and its individual member countries, 
see Diz Dias (2010).33
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3.5  SUMMARY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
The intensiﬁ  cation of the crisis in the last quarter 
of 2008, triggered by the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, brought about 
signiﬁ  cant changes compared with the pre-crisis 
period, in terms of the size, direction and nature 
of euro area cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows. 
First, there was a sizeable scaling-down of 
gross external asset holdings, amid soaring risk 
aversion, high liquidity needs and balance sheet 
restructuring. Flows reversed and their volatility 
markedly increased, with potential adverse effects 
for the real economy and ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Second, the strong increase in home bias and 
ﬂ  ight-to-safety behaviour – manifested in shifts 
in the composition of cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows – suggest that investors’ decisions were 
strongly affected not only by risk aversion, 
but, more broadly, by uncertainty aversion. 
The difﬁ   culty of identifying, tracing and 
quantifying ﬁ  nancial and economic risk in the 
global system, partly due to the complex inter-
relationships existing among ﬁ  nancial  and 
macroeconomic agents, ampliﬁ   ed the overall 
perception of risk by investors. Indeed, the 
element of uncertainty has featured prominently 
throughout this ﬁ  nancial crisis episode, having 
a clear impact on cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ   ows. Investor sentiment continued to swing 
signiﬁ  cantly in 2009 and 2010, often inﬂ  uenced 
by market news that rapidly changed collective 
expectations. In this context, a number of 
policies to restore conﬁ  dence and the smooth 
External debt indicators for selected countries
(as a percentage of GDP)
2006 2007 2008 2009
Gross external debt
Canada 54.3 56.5 52.1 71.3
Japan 34.7 40.4 45.4 42.1
Switzerland 266.2 334.6 245.9 250.3
United Kingdom 378.2 402.1 339.8 416.4
United States 83.6 95.4 95.2 96.5
Euro area 101.5 110.8 118.2 116.6
Gross external debt of general government
Canada 11.3 10.3 9.4 15.5
Japan 9.5 13.8 14.5 13.3
Switzerland 7.1 6.1 4.5 4.0
United Kingdom 11.5 12.1 12.2 18.2
United States 16.5 17.4 21.5 25.9
Euro area 13.0 13.8 18.3 21.4
Net external debt
Canada 22.2 23.6 19.5 20.9
Japan -50.6 -55.7 -48.1 -51.1
Switzerland -102.3 -117.3 -100.9 -120.9
United Kingdom 48.8 43.9 28.0 38.0
United States 39.9 46.0 49.2 46.6
Euro area 6.4 6.6 14.6 12.6
Net interest payments
Canada 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2
Japan -1.9 -2.3 -2.2 -1.8
Switzerland -3.0 -3.5 -3.5 -3.3
United Kingdom 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.3
United States 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3
Euro area 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Sources: ECB, IMF and ECB staff calculations.34
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functioning of various ﬁ  nancial market segments 
were deemed necessary and promptly introduced 
by the respective authorities. 
Third, although it was the global economic and 
ﬁ   nancial conditions that mainly drove cross-
border ﬂ  ows, country-speciﬁ  c risk factors seem 
to have gradually gained importance. This was, 
for example, evident in the second quarter of 
2010, when cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows  into 
euro area debt instruments decreased, following 
the sudden re-intensiﬁ  cation of ﬁ  nancial market 
tensions in May 2010. Rising concerns about 
the  ﬁ   scal situation in some of the euro area 
peripheral countries and growing fears of 
possible contagion in the rest of the euro area 
economy appear to have strongly inﬂ  uenced 
euro area cross-border ﬂ  ows and, to some extent, 
investors’ portfolio allocation worldwide.24
Finally, the ﬁ  nancial crisis changed the sectoral 
breakdown of the euro area’s net external 
borrowing, with the government sector becoming 
the main, and in most of 2010 the only, net 
borrower from abroad. In particular, the euro 
area’s external debt increased, mainly due to the 
increase in government debt, but this was in line 
with the upward trend in government borrowing 
throughout the world, which was largely 
the result of crisis-resolution interventions. 
Against this background, the debate about the 
level and dynamics of the government sector’s 
external debt re-emerged and the discussion on 
building buffers in good times in order to have 
room for manoeuvre during downturns became 
topical again. 
As the global economy started to show signs of 
stabilisation in 2009, some of the trends in gross 
cross-border  ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows observed during 
the crisis abated or, towards the end of the year, 
even reversed. This was the case of portfolio and 
direct investment, but less so of cross-border 
loans and deposits, where deleveraging was 
taking place. In the ﬁ  rst half of 2010, the revival 
of cross-border portfolio equity transactions and 
the loss of momentum in investment in debt 
instruments that occurred in 2009 moderated, 
as risk aversion rebounded and conﬁ  dence in a 
rapid recovery of the euro area and the global 
economy weakened in the second quarter of 
2010. In the second half of the year, investment 
in equities accelerated and investment in debt, 
notably in euro area government bonds and 
notes, rebounded. As regards other investment, 
the process of cross-border deleveraging in 
relation to loans and deposits appeared to have 
halted and signs of stronger ﬂ  ows both on the asset 
and on the liability sides emerged. Looking ahead, 
it is still uncertain what trends will prevail in the 
near future. Investors appear to have become 
more selective in qualitative terms, for example 
by differentiating across countries in relation to 
government debt securities. While the global 
economic outlook and ﬁ  scal developments are 
expected to play a key role, overall international 
ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows could still be affected by the 
balance sheet restructuring of ﬁ  nancial  and 
non-ﬁ   nancial corporations in advanced 
economies, including the euro area. Following 
the surge in international ﬁ  nancial  activity 
prior to the crisis, the recovery may not be 
synchronised across world regions, as shown 
by the stronger rebound of cross-border ﬂ  ows to 
emerging markets. 
See the box entitled “Developments in ﬁ  nancial markets in early  24 
May”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, June 2010.35
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The signiﬁ   cant changes in euro area 
cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, which took place 
during the global ﬁ   nancial crisis, may have 
important implications from a policy perspective. 
This crisis has shown that international ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ   ows can grow very rapidly and suddenly 
unwind, potentially having an impact on 
economic growth, real exchange rates, current 
account positions (Cardarelli et al. (2010)) 
and eventually on the stability of the ﬁ  nancial 
sector. The reasons why strong ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows 
may be a matter of concern are well known in 
the literature; the adverse impact is generally 
expected to be channelled via falling price 
competitiveness and rising ﬁ  nancial  fragility. 
As discussed in Ostry el al. (2010), ﬁ  nancial 
inﬂ   ows tend to become more problematic as 
evidence emerges of (i) currency overvaluation 
(ii) excessive reserve accumulation (iii) rising 
inﬂ   ationary pressures and (iv) signals of 
housing and lending booms. The policy tools to 
deal with ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows are also well known, 
in principle, and include monetary and ﬁ  scal 
policies, sterilisation, forms of capital controls, 
higher exchange rate ﬂ  exibility and enhanced 
macro-prudential measures. However, in 
practice they are far from trivial to implement 
for two reasons: ﬁ   rst, gearing macro policies 
toward discouraging ﬁ  nancial  inﬂ  ows  might 
have some serious drawbacks; for example 
a low interest rate environment might not be 
appropriate from a price stability perspective; 
second, several of the standard policies to cope 
with  ﬁ  nancial  inﬂ   ows are often difﬁ  cult  to 
implement and sustain in practice (Ostry et al. 
(2010), for a detailed review). 
An important additional aspect highlighted by 
the current crisis has been the distinction 
between the perils stemming from large net 
ﬁ  nancial  inﬂ   ows and those related to 
extraordinary growth of cross-border ﬂ  ows in 
gross terms. The latter could also signal growing 
vulnerabilities, since the expansion of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector may far exceed that of the real 
economy and constitute a cause for concern. 
Similarly to banks and ﬁ  rms, countries may also 
be “excessively leveraged”, facing liquidity 
shocks, when liabilities are withdrawn, or 
capital shocks, when the market-value of 
cross-border assets suddenly drops. The aim of 
this article is to illustrate the remarkable 
experience of the euro area during the “Great 
Recession”, notwithstanding the favourable 
context of a close-to-balance current account 
position and limited ﬁ  nancing  requirements. 
While the euro area’s experience is particularly 
interesting, considering the recentness of the 
creation of the monetary union, similar trends to 
those recorded in the euro area also affected the 
global economy. There is indeed a burgeoning 
literature on international capital ﬂ  ows which 
recognises the importance of the gross 
dimension of ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows. The large 
volatility of ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows seen during the 
global turmoil was also identiﬁ  ed in the context 
of the G20 as a key issue to be evaluated in the 
context of the reform of the international 
monetary system. A policy debate was initiated 
at the IMF (2010b) and (2011) and OECD 
(2011), on the challenges and responses to 
ﬁ   nancial globalisation. To develop a fully 
coherent framework for policy guidance across 
different countries substantial analytical work 
appears warranted.25
The discussion on international capital ﬂ  ows 
is also part of a much broader discussion on 
ﬁ   nancial interlinkages, which cannot abstract 
from the domestic dimension (IMF (2010b)). 
Therefore, a broad macro-prudential regulatory 
and supervisory framework is needed to reduce 
the possible risk and the negative feedback 
effects between the ﬁ   nancial and the real 
sector, both domestically and internationally. 
We conclude this paper, by emphasising the 
importance of expanding the monitoring 
framework for ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows and by proposing 
a few elements of the policy actions that could 
contribute to a more efﬁ  cient and sustainable 
allocation of cross-border ﬂ  ows.
See in particular IMF Public Information Notice No 11/1.  25 36
ECB
Occasional Paper No 126
July 2011
Expanding the analysis of developments in 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows
Given the lessons from the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, it appears essential to expand the analysis 
of cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows in order to better 
assess the ﬁ   nancial transmission channel and 
identify potential ﬁ  nancial fragilities.
The ﬁ  rst issue is far from trivial. For example, 
the impact cross-border ﬂ  ows have on exchange 
rates or other macroeconomic variables may 
counteract or reinforce standard adjustment 
mechanisms. While current account deﬁ  cits are 
generally expected to lead to weaker exchange 
rates,  ﬁ  nancial  inﬂ   ows may more than offset 
such deﬁ  cits. However, the evidence uncovered 
by the literature for periods of ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil seems more clear-cut. In such periods 
ﬁ  nancial outﬂ  ows and current account deﬁ  cits 
generally tend to reinforce each other and lead 
to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
The international transmission mechanism, via 
cross-border ﬂ  ows, may also operate differently 
through the banking and shadow banking 
sectors, with hidden risks suddenly becoming 
more apparent when global risk aversion and 
counterpart risk rise. 
On the issue of ﬁ   nancial fragility, signiﬁ  cant 
changes in cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows  and 
stocks could also be an important tool for 
detecting the emergence and build-up of 
potential macroeconomic risks. Large external 
deﬁ  cits are obviously worrisome as they may 
increase the probability of banking, currency 
and balance of payments crises, especially if 
there is a high proportion of debt ﬁ  nancing 
(Furceri et al. (2011)); but large surpluses may 
be challenging too, if associated with credit and 
housing booms. Moreover, even a favourable 
international investment position may hide a 
high degree of exposure to liquidity and capital 
shocks from abroad, when the size of the 
ﬁ  nancing sector and the leverage of the banking 
sector increase. Finally, while improving the 
monitoring of cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows may 
also involve the development of new or 
enhanced statistics,26 the greatest challenge is 
possibly to understand the drivers of ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows and their subcomponents, and to assess 
when they may be signalling rising ﬁ  nancial 
fragility.
Promoting macroeconomic discipline and 
enhancing ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision
Given that advanced economies typically refrain 
from using “direct” policies – such as capital 
controls and exchange rate intervention – the 
impact that the large size, pro-cyclicality or 
volatility of cross-border ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows have on 
macroeconomic variables and ﬁ  nancial stability 
has to be addressed via other, “indirect”, policy 
channels. For countries and governments 
that wish to maximise the long-term gains of 
ﬁ  nancial openness, while minimising short-term 
risks, policies that promote macroeconomic 
discipline or enhance ﬁ  nancial supervision and 
regulation should play a key role.
On the importance of macroeconomic 
discipline, the sheer size of pre-crisis ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ   ows, suggests that sound macroeconomic 
policies are essential to maintain a sustainable 
growth path, to preserve the gains from 
ﬁ  nancial openness and to mitigate the adverse 
impact associated with ﬁ   nancial crises. For 
example, countries running high ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cits 
prior to the crisis appear (i) to have been 
affected more by the crisis, experiencing higher 
volatility of ﬁ  nancial market variables or even 
a stronger reversal of ﬁ  nancial  inﬂ  ows,  and 
(ii) to have had a limited ability to respond to 
the crisis, for example by re-establishing 
foreign investors’ conﬁ  dence and re-attracting 
foreign capital (van Riet (2010)). To achieve a 
viable medium-term ﬁ  scal framework, it seems 
particularly important not only to reduce the 
debt level, but also to improve the maturity 
structure of external debt to minimise the 
“bunching effect” (Calvo and Reinhart (1999)) 
and the country’s overall vulnerability to 
external shocks. Structural reforms that 
increase the economy’s ﬂ  exibility can also help 
to improve the overall allocation of ﬁ  nancial 
Waysand et al. (2010) and OECD (2011). 26 37
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inﬂ  ows to productive investment, which has a 
potentially corrective and non-exacerbating 
effect on pre-existing domestic distortions in 
the recipient economy.27
With respect to  ﬁ   nancial supervision and 
regulation, the strong tendency for banks to 
take on greater risk in periods when access to 
international capital is relatively favourable, 
as was the case in the years before the turmoil, 
highlights the importance of bank supervision 
(Calvo and Reinhart (1999)). For example, 
recent work shows the interaction of prudential 
policies with ﬁ  nancial vulnerabilities connected 
to bank-related ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows (IMF (2010a)). 
However, the patterns of cross-border ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ   ows seen during the ﬁ   nancial crisis have 
shown that it is not only banks that need to be 
adequately supervised and regulated, but also 
the broader ﬁ   nancial sector, including other 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, as the latter have been 
very active in cross-border ﬁ  nancial transactions 
(currently captured in the balance of payments 
under the broad umbrella item “other sectors”).28 
Prudential regulation is also likely to inﬂ  uence 
the composition and – to a smaller degree – the 
volume of cross-border ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows,  thus 
building additional buffers in the ﬁ  nancial 
sector (IMF (2010)) that could help reduce 
cross-country and cross-sectoral ﬁ  nancial 
fragilities.
Taken together, sound macroeconomic policies 
and enhanced supervisory and regulatory 
frameworks may also help to reduce uncertainty. 
As could also be observed during the recent 
crisis, imperfectly informed investors tend to 
infer underlying conditions from the actions of 
other, not necessarily better informed, investors. 
This leads to herding and, when inferences 
are negative, a rush for the exits (Eichengreen 
(2007)), which accounts for volatility spikes in 
international ﬂ  ows. 
Cardarelli et al. (2010) argue, on the basis of previous empirical  27 
episodes, that the control of public expenditure is a stabilising 
factor in the event of a surge in private capital ﬂ  ows, while 
sterilisation and the tightening of capital controls appear to be 
less effective in this respect.
In order to do that, policy-makers need to be able to evaluate the  28 
shadow banking system in greater depth (and in a more holistic 
way) as well as the structures and operations of new ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and the beneﬁ  ts and risks of securitisation activities 
(for example, Hartmann et al. (2007) and Eichner et al. (2010)).38
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2003 54.3 -281.3 -178.9 -24.4 -78.0 335.6 193.0 31.9 110.7
2004 44.3 -345.4 -181.1 -57.9 -106.4 389.7 268.8 17.0 103.9
2005 106.2 -416.8 -264.9 -17.3 -134.6 523.0 247.4 37.3 238.3
2006 186.2 -520.2 -300.9 -63.2 -156.1 706.4 480.5 -19.6 245.5
2007 126.8 -439.5 -293.4 -83.4 -62.7 566.3 341.1 60.6 164.6
2008 283.3 7.2 -80.7 -10.1 98.0 276.1 177.8 182.9 -84.6
2009 270.7 -84.3 -30.2 -7.2 -46.8 355.0 123.3 119.9 111.8
2010 143.2 -140.7 -103.7 44.0 -81.0 283.9 134.4 2.1 147.5
Source: ECB.
Note: MFIs include Eurosystem.
Table A2 Other investment
(EUR billions)
Net Abroad Government MFIs 
Other 
sectors In euro area Government MFIs
Other 
sectors
2003 -72.7 -248.8 -0.4 -150.5 -97.9 176.1 -3.4 145.6 33.9
2004 -47.7 -333.6 -1.7 -256.6 -75.3 285.9 -3.8 255.2 34.6
2005 62.2 -584.4 7.4 -400.8 -191.0 646.6 -3.1 495.7 154.0
2006 -30.8 -788.1 7.2 -531.4 -263.8 757.2 1.8 526.1 229.3
2007 38.6 -915.8 7.8 -559.9 -363.8 954.4 -1.0 713.6 241.8
2008 180.5 1.2 5.7 52.1 -56.6 179.3 9.3 106.3 63.7
2009 -193.1 534.6 -10.7 421.6 123.7 -727.7 12.5 -586.3 -153.8
2010 -28.1 -130.0 -39.6 -5.5 -84.9 101.9 64.4 6.0 31.6
Source: ECB.
Note: MFIs include Eurosystem.
Table A3 Direct investment 
(EUR billions)









2003 -9.6 -146.2 -115.8 -14.1 -16.3 136.6 108.7 17.8 10.1
2004 -79.2 -169.1 -137.8 -39.0 7.7 89.9 65.3 25.7 -1.1
2005 -204.1 -358.4 -262.1 -39.8 -56.5 154.3 134.4 -12.8 32.7
2006 -159.7 -418.1 -293.0 -40.3 -84.7 258.4 187.4 38.1 32.9
2007 -90.4 -512.9 -318.4 -71.4 -123.1 422.5 271.7 43.7 107.1
2008 -236.0 -328.8 -200.6 5.2 -133.4 92.8 40.0 17.8 35.0
2009 -109.4 -325.3 -217.9 -16.2 -91.1 215.9 204.4 12.0 -0.5
2010 -78.6 -166.5 -51.3 -0.4 -114.9 87.9 120.1 16.6 -48.9
Source: ECB.
Note: MFIs include Eurosystem.
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